Parity clauses remain firmly on the German competition authority’s radar, as the recent CHECK24 case illustrates. More importantly, the authority’s concerns are not limited to classic contractual clauses. They also extend to ranking, visibility and other commercial tools capable of producing similar effects.
What happened
The German Federal Cartel Office closed its investigation into CHECK24 by accepting commitments rather than issuing a formal infringement decision.[1] Even so, the case sends a clear enforcement signal: parity mechanisms remain a high-risk area, particularly where a platform constitutes an important route to market.
What was under scrutiny
The case concerned clauses requiring energy suppliers either to offer their cheapest tariff on CHECK24 or not to offer the same products more cheaply through other channels. In the authority’s preliminary view, such arrangements may restrict competition between platforms, make entry or expansion more difficult for smaller rivals, and potentially raise concerns both under the rules on anti-competitive agreements and under abuse of dominance principles.
Why this matters beyond energy
The logic of the case is not confined to the energy sector. The concern is that parity mechanisms can limit a supplier’s ability to differentiate across channels and, in turn, reduce competition between intermediaries. That logic is equally relevant in travel, food delivery, marketplaces and other platform settings in which platforms compete for supply and consumer attention.
Not just contract wording
What makes CHECK24 particularly interesting is that the case is not limited to express parity clauses. CHECK24 committed that commissions, ranking and visibility would not depend on whether suppliers offer lower prices elsewhere. The decision also refers to so-called “dimming” – reducing a supplier’s prominence because it is cheaper on another channel.[2]
That matters because it shows that the competitive concern is not only about the wording of a contract. It is also about whether a platform’s commercial architecture effectively discourages suppliers from differentiating across channels. In practice, the risk may therefore arise not only from written clauses, but also from ranking logic, visibility rules or other commercial incentives that produce the same result.
Both wide and narrow parity clauses are in scope
The commitments cover restrictions relating both to competing platforms and to a supplier’s own direct sales channels, such as its website or call centre. This is broadly consistent with the Federal Cartel Office’s earlier decisional practice: HRS concerned wide parity clauses covering both rival platforms and direct channels, while Booking showed that narrow direct-channel clauses may also raise concerns.[3]
Why platform operators should pay attention
For platforms, especially those with strong market coverage, the lesson is straightforward. It is no longer enough to review only classic “best price” clauses. Platforms should also examine any mechanism that may discourage business users from offering better terms elsewhere.
That includes contractual language, onboarding conditions, commission models, ranking criteria, visibility settings and account management practices. The broader point is simple: in this area, substance matters more than form. Removing an explicit clause may not be sufficient if the same commercial outcome is achieved indirectly.
A broader lesson for platforms
CHECK24 is a reminder that, from the Federal Cartel Office’s perspective, parity concerns are not confined to classic MFN clauses. The more important question is whether a platform’s contractual and commercial set-up makes it harder for suppliers to differentiate across channels. That is a question with implications well beyond the energy sector.
[1] Federal Cartel Office, decision of 18 February 2026, B8-40/25, available at 20260218_B8-40-25-Beschluss-geschwärzt.
[2] Regarding dimming cf. Höppner/Uphues, Algorithmic enforcement of price parity, available at https://awards.concurrences.com/en/awards/2025/business-articles/algorithmic-enforcement-of-price-parity.
[3] Federal Cartel Office, decision of 20 December 2013, B9-66/10 (HRS), available at B9-66-10.pdf; Federal Cartel Office, decision of 22 December 2015, B9-121/13 (Booking), available at B9-121-13.pdf.
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